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A Neural-Network based Approach for Nash Equilibrium Seeking in
Mixed-order Multi-player Games
Maojiao Ye and Jizhao Yin
Abstract—Noticing that agents with different dynamics may
work together, this paper considers Nash equilibrium compu-
tation for a class of games in which first-order integrator-type
players and second-order integrator-type players interact in
a distributed network. To deal with this situation, we firstly
exploit a centralized method for full information games. In the
considered scenario, the players can employ its own gradient
information, though it may rely on all players’ actions. Based
on the proposed centralized algorithm, we further develop a
distributed counterpart. Different from the centralized one,
the players are assumed to have limited access into the other
players’ actions. In addition, noticing that unmodeled dynamics
and disturbances are inevitable for practical engineering sys-
tems, the paper further considers games in which the players’
dynamics are suffering from unmodeled dynamics and time-
varying disturbances. In this situation, an adaptive neural
network is utilized to approximate the unmodeled dynamics and
disturbances, based on which a centralized Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithm and a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm are established successively. Appropriate Lyapunov
functions are constructed to investigate the effectiveness of the
proposed methods analytically. It is shown that if the considered
mixed-order game is free of unmodeled dynamics and distur-
bances, the proposed method would drive the players’ actions
to the Nash equilibrium exponentially. Moreover, if unmodeled
dynamics and disturbances are considered, the players’ actions
would converge to arbitrarily small neighborhood of the Nash
equilibrium. Lastly, the theoretical results are numerically
verified by simulation examples.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking; mixed-order dy-
namics; games; distributed network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing decision-
making processes in which multiple rational decision-makers
interact with each other. For example, optimal charging of
plug-in electric vehicles [1], economic dispatch [2], coor-
dinative control in mobile sensor networks [3], formation
control [4], energy consumption control in smart grids [8][9],
to mention just a few, are representatives that fall into the
game theoretic framework. Inspired by the broad applications
of game theoretic approaches, many researchers devoted
themselves to the development of Nash equilibrium seeking
strategies and quite a few Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
have been reported in the existing literature. For example,
games with first-order dynamic players were investigated in
[5]-[7] and [27]-[29]. Nash equilibrium seeking protocols for
M. Ye and J. Yin are with the School of Automation, Nanjing Uni-
versity of Science and Technology, 210094, P.R. China (Email-address:
ye0003ao@e.ntu.edu.sg, yinjizhao@njust.edu.cn).
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (NSFC), No. 61803202 and the Natural Science Foundation of
Jiangsu Province, No. BK20180455.
second-order dynamic players and linear time-invariant dy-
namic players were studied in [10][11] and [12], respectively.
Nevertheless, only a few works reported results on Nash
equilibrium seeking for heterogeneous multi-player games.
In [13], distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms
were developed for heterogeneous Euler-Lagrange systems.
The work in [14] considered distributed Nash equilibrium
computation for games with first-order continuous-time play-
ers and discrete-time players. However, due to the different
computation capabilities of distinct computing units, various
hardware environments and diversities of the agents’ dy-
namics, multi-agent systems show remarkable and versatile
heterogeneities. Inspired by the above observations, hetero-
geneous multi-agent systems have been widely explored.
For example, linear heterogeneous multi-agent systems with
distinct constant matrices in the agents’ dynamics were in-
vestigated for formation control, output regulation problems
and distributed optimal coordination problems in [16]-[18]
and [24], respectively. Nonlinear heterogeneous multi-agent
systems, in which both the state dynamics and dimensions
can be different were addressed in [19]. Heterogeneous
multi-agent systems consisting of first-order continuous-
time agents and first-order discrete-time agents were studied
in [20]. Besides, second-order heterogeneous multi-agent
systems, in which the agents’ inertias and control gains
were time-varying, were investigated in [21]. In particular,
as velocity-actuated vehicles and acceleration-actuated
vehicles might work together, heterogeneous multi-agent
systems composed of first-order agents and second-order
agents occupy an important position [22].
Consensus of heterogeneous multi-agent systems com-
posed of first-order agents and second-order agents without
utilizing velocity measurements was investigated in [23].
Average consensus tracking for sensor networks in which
velocity-actuated sensors and force-actuated sensors exist
simultaneously was investigated in [22]. Two stationary
consensus algorithms were designed for discrete-time hetero-
geneous multi-agent systems composed of first-order agents
and second-order agents in [15] with bounded communica-
tion delays considered. However, Nash equilibrium com-
putation for mixed-order multi-player games consisting
of first-order players and second-order players hasn’t
been addressed yet though it is a problem of great
importance. Inspired by the above observation, this paper
tries to accommodate Nash equilibrium computation for
games with mixed-order integrator-type dynamics. Moreover,
noticing that in many practical situations, e.g., physical
hydraulic systems [32], air hybrid vehicles [33] and marine
surface vessels [34], external disturbances and unmodeled
dynamics are inevitable due to complex working environment
of engineering actuators and limited knowledge about the
explicit system model, this paper further addresses Nash
equilibrium computation for mixed-order games in which the
players’ dynamics are suffering from unmodeled dynamics
and disturbances. Noticing that radial basis function neural
network (RBFNN) has been shown to be capable of approx-
imating unknown continuous functions over a compact set
(see, e.g., [31][35]-[38]). This paper takes the benefits of
the RRBFNN to establish robust Nash equilibrium seeking
strategies for the considered mixed-order multi-player games.
Compared with the existing works, the main contributions of
the paper are summarized as follows.
1) Nash equilibrium seeking for mixed-order multi-player
games, in which first-order integrator-type players and
second-order integrator-type players coexist is investi-
gated in this paper. To the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, mixed-order multi-player games have rarely been
investigated by the existing works. The exploration of
this paper would broaden the applicable fields of game
theoretic approaches for distributed games with mixed-
order players.
2) Games with ideal mixed-order players are investigated,
followed by the case in which the players’ dynamics
are suffering from unmodeled dynamics and external
disturbances. For both situations, a centralized algo-
rithm and a distributed algorithm are proposed. In
particular, the unmodeled dynamics are accommodated
by neural networks. Compared with the RISE-based
method in [26], the conditions on the unmodeled
dynamics and disturbances are relaxed to some extent.
3) The convergence results of the proposed algorithms are
analytically investigated by utilizing Lyapunov stability
analysis. It is theoretically proven that the players’
actions would be driven to the Nash equilibrium if
there is no unmodeled dynamics and disturbances.
Moreover, with unmodeled dynamics and disturbances,
the players’ actions can be driven to arbitrarily small
neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Notations
and preliminaries are given in Section II. The problem
formulation is given in Section III and the main results
are presented in Sections IV-V. For games with mixed-order
players, a centralized algorithm and a distributed algorithm
will be given successively. Moreover, the cases in which the
game is subject to unmodeled dynamics and disturbances will
be considered following the ideal disturbance-free situation.
The numerical examples are presented in Section VI and the
conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Notations: In this paper, we use R to denote the set of
real numbers. The notation max{l¯i} (min{l¯i}) defines the
maximum (minimum) value of l¯i for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
A = [aij ] defines a matrix whose entry on the ith row and
jth column is aij . For a symmetric matrix Q ∈ RN×N ,
λmin(Q) and λmax(Q) are the minimum and maximum
eigenvalues of Q, respectively. Moreover, diag{aij} for
i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are a11, a12, · · · , a1N , a21, · · · , aNN and
⊗ is the Kronecker product.
Graph theory: For a graph defined as G = (ℵ, E), where
ℵ = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of vertices and E ⊆ ℵ × ℵ
is the set of edges. The network is undirected if for every
(i, j) ∈ E , we have (j, i) ∈ E . In addition, the undirected
graph is connected if there is a path between any pair of
distinct vertices. The adjacency matrix associated with graph
G is defined as A = [aij ], where aij = 1 if node (j, i) ∈ E ,
else, aij = 0 (aii = 0). Furthermore, the Laplacian matrix
associated with G is defined as L = D − A where D is a
diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal entry is equal to the out
degree of node i, represented by
∑N
j=1 aij [5].
Radial basis function neural networks: A continuous
function l(z) : RN → RN can be approximated on a compact
set z ∈ Ωz ⊂ RN by
lNN (z) = W
TS(z), (1)
where W ∈ Rq×N is an adjustable weight matrix, q is the
number of neuron, and S(z) = [s1(z), s2(z), · · · , sq(z)]T is
the activation function given by
si(z) = exp
[−(z − µi)T (z − µi)
ρ2i
]
, i = 1, 2, · · · , q, (2)
where µi = [µi1, µi2, · · · , µiN ]T is the center of the recep-
tive field, and ρi denotes the width of the Gaussian function
[31].
Lemma 1: [31] For any arbitrary small positive constant ε¯
and z ∈ Ωz , there exists a weight matrix W ∗ ∈ Rq×N such
that
l(z) = W ∗TS(z) + ε, (3)
where ε is the approximation error that satisfies |ε| ≤ ε¯.
Lemma 2: [31] Let V (t) ≥ 0 be a continuous function
defined for all ∀t ≥ 0. Suppose that there are positive
constants a, b such that
V˙ (t) ≤ −aV (t) + b, (4)
then
V (t) ≤ V (0)e−at + b
a
(1− e−at). (5)
Lemma 3: [30] For any ǫ > 0 and η ∈ R,
0 ≤ |η|−ηtanh(η
ǫ
) ≤ Kǫ, (6)
where K is a constant that satisfies K = e−K+1.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a game with N players whose dynamics are
governed by
x˙f = uf +Υ(gf (x) + df (t)), f ∈ νf
x¨s = us +Υ(gs(x) + ds(t)), s ∈ νs,
(7)
where xf , xs ∈ R, uf , us ∈ R are the actions and the control
inputs of players f and s, respectively. Furthermore, νf =
{1, 2, · · · , n} and νs = {n+1, n+2, · · · , N} (N > n). It’s
worth mentioning that following the above definitions, we get
that ℵ = νf
⋃
νs. Note that gf (x), gs(x) and df (t), ds(t)
are the unmodeled terms and external disturbances whose
explicit expressions are unknown. In addition, Υ is a variable
that is equal to 0 or 1 and these two cases will be investigated
successively in the rest. This paper aims to design control
laws to seek the Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) on which
Fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ Fi(xi,x∗−i), (8)
for xi ∈ R, i ∈ ℵ, and x−i =
[x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T . In addition, Fi(x),
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T , is the cost function of player
i.
For notational convenience, define ∇iFi(x) = ∂Fi(x)∂xi , and
∇2ijFi(x) = ∂
2Fi(x)
∂xi∂xj
. The following assumptions will be
utilized in the upcoming analysis.
Assumption 1: For each i ∈ ℵ, Fi(x) is twice-
continuously differentiable and∇iFi(x) is globally Lipschitz
for x ∈ RN .
Remark 1: By Assumption 1, there exists a positive con-
stant l¯i such that ‖∇iFi(x) −∇iFi(z)‖ ≤ l¯i‖x − z‖ for
x, z ∈ RN , i ∈ ℵ. Moreover,∥∥P¯(x)− P¯(z)∥∥ ≤ l1‖x− z‖, (9)
where P¯(x) = [∇1F1(x),∇2F2(x), · · · ,∇NFN (x)]T , and
l1 =
√
Nmax{l¯i}.
Assumption 2: The players can communicate with each
other by utilizing an undirected and connected graph G.
Remark 2: By Assumption 2, −(L⊗ IN×N +A), where
A = diag{aij} and IN×N is an N ×N dimensional identity
matrix, is Hurwitz and there exist symmetric positive definite
matrices P and Q of compatible dimensions such that P(L⊗
IN×N +A) + (L ⊗ IN×N +A)P = Q [5].
Assumption 3: For all x, z ∈ RN ,
(x− z)T (P¯(x)− P¯(z)) ≥ m||x− z||2, (10)
where m is a positive constant.
Assumption 4: The elements in H(x) defined as H(x) =
[∇2i,jFn+1(x)], where i ∈ νs, j ∈ ℵ are bounded for x ∈
R
N .
Remark 3: By Assumption 4, there exists a positive con-
stant h such that sup
x∈RN‖H(x)‖≤ h.
IV. MIXED-ORDER MULTI-PLAYER GAMES
In this section, we suppose that Υ = 0 in (7). If this is
the case, the dynamics of the players in the considered game
are
x˙f = uf , f ∈ νf
x¨s = us, s ∈ νs.
(11)
In the subsequent subsections, a centralized seeking algo-
rithm and a distributed seeking algorithm will be established
one by one.
A. A centralized algorithm for mixed-order multi-player
games
Suppose that each player can access its own gradient value,
then, the control input can be designed as
uf = −k1∇fFf (x), f ∈ νf
us = −k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(x), s ∈ νs,
(12)
where k1, k2, are positive control gains.
Recalling that the players’ dynamics are governed by (11),
we get that
x˙f = −k1∇fFf (x), f ∈ νf ,
x˙s = vs,
v˙s = −k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(x), s ∈ νs,
(13)
where vs is the velocity of player s, s ∈ νs.
Writing (13) in its concatenated-vector form gives
x˙f = −k1P¯f(x)
x˙s = vs
v˙s = −k2vs − k1k2P¯s(x),
(14)
where P¯f (x) = [∇1F1(x),∇2F2(x), · · · ,∇nFn(x)]T ,
P¯s(x) = [∇n+1Fn+1(x),∇n+2Fn+2(x), · · · ,∇NFN (x)]T ,
xf = [x1, x2 · · · , xn]T , xs = [xn+1, xn+2 · · · , xN ]T , and
vs = [vn+1, vn+2 · · · , vN ]T . Note that by the above defini-
tions, [P¯f (x)T , P¯s(x)T ]T = P¯(x), [xTf ,xTs ]T = x.
The following theorem shows the stability of the system
in (13).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1,3-4 are satisfied
and
k2 >
(k21hl1 + 1)
2
4k1m
+ k1h. (15)
Then, the Nash equilibrium is globally exponentially stable
under (13).
Proof: Let
vs = v¯s − k1P¯s(x). (16)
Then, by (14) and (16), we get that
v˙s = −k2(vs + k1P¯s(x)) = −k2v¯s. (17)
Moreover,
x˙s =v¯s − k1P¯s(x)
˙¯vs =v˙s + k1H(x)x˙ = −k2v¯s + k1H(x)x˙.
(18)
Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗) + 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s. (19)
Then,
V˙ =(x− x∗)T x˙+ v¯Ts ˙¯vs
=
(
xf − x∗f
)T
x˙f + (xs − x∗s)T x˙s
+ v¯Ts (−k2v¯s + k1H(x)x˙)
=− (xf − x∗f)T k1P¯f (x)
+ (xs − x∗s)T (v¯s − k1P¯s(x))
− k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1v¯Ts H(x)x˙
=− k1(x − x∗)T P¯(x) + (xs − xs∗)T v¯s
− k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1v¯Ts H(x)φ¯1
=− k1(x − x∗)T P¯(x) + (xs − xs∗)T v¯s
− k2‖v¯s‖2 − k21v¯Ts H(x)P¯(x) + k1v¯Ts H(x)φ¯2,
(20)
where φ¯1 =
[−k1[P¯f(x)]T vTs ]T =[−k1[P¯f(x)]T (v¯s − k1P¯s(x))T ]T and φ¯2 =[
0Tn v¯
T
s
]T
.
By Assumption 1, ‖P¯(x)‖ =
∥∥P¯(x)− P¯(x∗)∥∥ ≤ l1‖x−
x∗‖. Hence, k21v¯Ts H(x)P¯(x) ≤ k21l1h||x − x∗||||v¯s|| by
Assumptions 1 and 4. Therefore,
V˙ ≤− k1m‖x− x∗‖2 − (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2
+ (k21l1h+ 1)‖x− x∗‖‖v¯s‖,
(21)
by further utilizing Assumption 3.
Define A =
[
k1m −k
2
1hl1+1
2
−k21hl1+12 k2 − k1h
]
and let k2 >
(k21hl1+1)
2
4k1m
+k1h. Then, A is symmetric positive definite and
V˙ ≤ −λmin(A)‖E‖2, (22)
where λmin(A) > 0, and E = [(x− x∗)T , v¯Ts ]T ,
Recalling the definition of the Lyapunov candidate func-
tion, it is clear that
V =
1
2
||E||2. (23)
Hence,
V˙ ≤ −2λmin(A)V, (24)
which further indicates that
‖E(t)‖≤ e−λmin(A)t‖E(0)‖. (25)
Define Er(t) = [(x−x∗)T ,vTs ]T . Then, ‖Er(t)‖
≤ ‖E(t)‖+k1‖P¯s(x)‖≤ (1 + l1k1)‖E(t)‖≤ (1 +
l1k1)e
−λmin(A)t‖E(0)‖≤ (1 + l1k1)e−λmin(A)t (‖Er(0)‖+
k1‖P¯s(0)‖) ≤(1 + l1k1)2e−λmin(A)t‖Er(0)‖, thus arriving
at the conclusion. 
In Section IV-A, the players are supposed to have access
to their own gradient values. However, the players’ gradient
values rely on all the players’ actions, which can hardly
be obtained in many practical situations. Hence, in the
following, a distributed seeking algorithm will be established.
B. A distributed algorithm for mixed-order multi-player
games
To establish a distributed seeking algorithm, the control
inputs are designed as
uf = −k1∇fFf (yf ), f ∈ νf
us = −k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(ys), s ∈ νs,
(26)
where k1, k2 are positive parameters, yi =
[yi1, yi2, · · · yiN ]T stands for player i’s local estimates
on x and yij is player i’s estimate on xj . In addition,
∇iFi(yi) = ∇iFi(x)|x=yi . Moreover, motivated by [5], yij
is generated by
y˙ij = −k3
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
, (27)
for all i, j ∈ ℵ, where k3 is a positive control gain.
Recalling that the players’ dynamics are governed by (11),
it can be obtained that
x˙f = −k1∇fFf (yf ), f ∈ νf
x˙s = vs
v˙s = −k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(ys), s ∈ νs
y˙ij = −k3
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
,
(28)
where in the last equation, i, j ∈ ℵ.
Writing (28) in its concatenated-vector form yields
x˙f = −k1P¯f (y¯f )
x˙s = vs
v˙s = −k2vs − k1k2P¯s(y¯s)
y˙ = −k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x),
(29)
where y = [yT1 ,y
T
2 , · · · ,yTN ]T , y¯f = [yT1 ,yT2 , · · · ,yTn ],
y¯s = [y
T
n+1,y
T
n+2, · · · ,yTN ], P¯(y¯f ) =
[∇1F1(y1),∇2F2(y2), · · · ,∇nFn(yn)]T , and P¯(y¯s) =
[∇n+1Fn+1(yn+1),∇n+2Fn+2(yn+2), · · · ,∇NFN (yN )]T .
Moreover, for notational convenience,
let P¯(y) = [P¯(y¯f )T , P¯(y¯s)T ]T and
H1(y¯s) ∈ R(N−n)×N2 whose jth row is
[0T
N(j−1),∇2n+j,1Fn+j(yn+j),∇2n+j,2Fn+j(yn+j), · · · ,
∇2n+j,NFn+j(yn+j),0TN(N−j)]. Then, the following result
can be obtained.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied
and
k1 >
1
2m
+
(maxi∈ℵ{l¯i}+ 2
√
N‖P‖l1)2σ1
2m
(30a)
k3 >
2k1‖P‖l1 + k
2
1
2σ1
+
√
N‖P‖+ σ2b2
λmin(Q) (30b)
k2 >
1
2
+
√
N‖P‖+ k
2
1k
2
3b
2σ2,
(30c)
in which, b = sup
y¯s∈RN(N−n)‖H1(y¯s)‖‖L ⊗ IN×N + A‖
and σ1 and σ2 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen. Then, the Nash equilibrium is globally exponentially
stable under (28).
Proof: Let
vs = v¯s − k1P¯s(y¯s). (31)
Then, by (29), we have
v˙s = −k2v¯s. (32)
Hence,
x˙s =v¯s − k1P¯s(y¯s)
˙¯vs =v˙s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys
=− k2v¯s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys.
(33)
Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(x− x∗)T (x− x∗) + 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x).
(34)
Then, it can be easily concluded that d¯1‖E‖2≤
V ≤ d¯2‖E‖2, where d¯1 = min{ 12 , λmin(P)}, d¯2 =
max{ 12 , λmax(P)} and E = [(x − x∗)T , v¯Ts , (y − 1N ⊗
x)T ]T .
Moreover,
V˙ =(x− x∗)T x˙+ v¯Ts ˙¯vs
+ (y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙),
(35)
in which
(x− x∗)T x˙ =− (xf − x∗f )T k1P¯f (y¯f )
+ (xs − x∗s)T (v¯s − k1P¯s(y¯s))
=− k1(x− x∗)TP¯(y) + (xs − xs∗)Tv¯s
=− k1 (x− x∗)T P¯(x)
+ k1 (x− x∗)T (P¯(x)− P¯(y))
+ (xs − xs∗)Tv¯s.
(36)
By Assumption 3, − (x− x∗)T P¯(x) ≤ −m‖x− x∗‖2.
Moreover, by Assumption 1, we get that
∥∥P¯(x)− P¯(y)∥∥ ≤
maxi∈ℵ{l¯i}‖y− 1N ⊗ x‖. Hence,
(x− x∗)T x˙ ≤− k1m‖x− x∗‖2 + ‖x− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖x− x∗‖‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖.
(37)
Moreover,
v¯Ts ˙¯vs = v¯
T
s (−k2v¯s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys). (38)
Recalling the definition of ˙¯ys, we get that
v¯Ts ˙¯vs ≤ −k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1k3b‖v¯s‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x‖, (39)
where b = sup
y¯s∈RN(N−n)‖H1(y¯s)‖‖L ⊗ IN×N +A‖.
Furthermore,
(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)
=(−k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x)
− 1N ⊗ φ¯3)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(−k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x)
− 1N ⊗ φ¯3)
=− k3(y − 1N ⊗ x)T(L ⊗ IN×N +A)P(y − 1N ⊗ x)
− k3(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(L⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x)
− 2(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP1N ⊗ φ¯3
in which φ¯3 =
[−k1[P¯f (y¯f )]T vTs ]T =[
−k1[P¯f (y¯f )]T v¯Ts − k1P¯s(y¯s)T
]T
.
By Assumption 1, it can be obtained that
2(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP1N ⊗ φ¯3
≤2k1||P||l1||y − 1N ⊗ x||2
+ 2k1
√
N ||P||l1||y − 1N ⊗ x||||x− x∗||
+ 2
√
N ||P||||y − 1N ⊗ x||||v¯s||.
(40)
Therefore,
(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)
≤− k3λmin(Q)‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ 2k1‖P‖l1‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ 2k1
√
N‖P‖l1‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖
+ 2
√
N‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x‖‖v¯s‖.
(41)
Hence,
V˙ ≤ − k1m‖x− x∗‖2 − k2‖vs‖2 + ‖vs‖‖x− x∗‖
− (k3λmin(Q)− 2k1‖P‖l1)‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖2
+ k1(max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}+ 2
√
N‖P‖l1)‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖‖x− x∗‖
+ (2
√
N‖P‖+ k1k3b)‖vs‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x‖
≤ −Ψ1‖x− x∗‖2
− (k2 − 1
2
−
√
N‖P‖ − k
2
1k
2
3b
2σ2
)‖vs‖2
−Ψ2‖y − 1N ⊗ x‖2,
(42)
where σ1 and σ2 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen and Ψ1 = k1m − 12 − (maxi∈ℵ{l¯i}+2
√
N‖P‖l1)2σ1
2 ,
Ψ2 = k3λmin(Q)− 2k1‖P‖l1 − k
2
1
2σ1
−√N‖P‖ − σ2b2 .
Therefore,
V˙ ≤ −K‖E‖2, (43)
where K = min{Ψ1, k2− 12 −
√
N‖P‖− k21k23b2σ2 ,Ψ2} > 0 by
choosing k1 according to 30a, followed by choosing k3 and
k2 according to and , successively for fixed σ1, σ2.
Hence,
‖E(t)‖≤
√
d¯2
d¯1
e
− K
2d¯2
t‖E(0)‖, (44)
by using the Comparison Lemma [25].
Furthermore, define Er(t) = [(x − x∗)T ,vTs , (y − 1N ⊗
x)T ]T . Then,
‖Er(t)‖≤ ‖E(t)‖+k1‖P¯s(y¯s)‖
≤(1 + k1
√
N − nmax
j∈νs
{l¯j})‖E(t)‖
≤(1 + k1
√
N − nmax
j∈νs
{l¯j})
√
d¯2
d¯1
e
− K
2d¯2
t‖E(0)‖
≤(1 + k1
√
N − nmax
j∈νs
{l¯j})
√
d¯2
d¯1
e
− K
2d¯2
t
× (‖Er(0)‖+k1‖P¯s(0)‖)
≤(1 + k1
√
N − nmax
j∈νs
{l¯j})2
√
d¯2
d¯1
e
− K
2d¯2
t‖Er(0)‖,
(45)
thus arriving at the conclusion. 
In this section, we consider that the mixed-order game
is free of unmodeled dynamics and external disturbances.
However, due to limited knowledge about explicit system
model and complicated working environments of actuators
and sensors, unmodeled dynamics and disturbances are in-
evitable in practice. Hence, in the following section, we
consider mixed-order games with unmodeled dynamics and
disturbances.
V. MIXED-ORDER MULTI-PLAYER GAMES WITH
UNMODELED DYNAMICS AND THE EXTERNAL
DISTURBANCE
In this section, we consider that the players’ dynamics are
given by
x˙f = uf + gf (x) + df (t), f ∈ νf
x¨s = us + gs(x) + ds(t), s ∈ νs.
(46)
In the following, a centralized seeking method and a dis-
tributed seeking method will be presented, successively.
A. A centralized algorithm for mixed-order multi-player
games
In this section, we consider that the players’ gradient
values are accessible. Moreover, a RBFNN is adopted to
deal with the unmodeled dynamics and external disturbances
based on the following condition.
Assumption 5: For each i ∈ ℵ, gi(x) is globally Lipschitz
and di(t) is bounded.
Remark 4: Note that in [26], it is required that the un-
modeled dynamics gi(x) is sufficiently smooth with its
first two partial derivatives being bounded given that x is
bounded. Similarly, the disturbance di(t) was supposed to be
sufficiently smooth with its first two time derivatives being
bounded in [26]. From Assumption 5, we see that these
conditions are relaxed to some extent in this paper.
Based on the RBFNN, the control inputs are designed as
uf = −k4(xf − zf )− WˆTf Sf (x¯)− φf
z˙f = −k1∇fFf (x¯), f ∈ νf
us = −k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(x¯)− WˆTs Ss(x¯)− φs, s ∈ νs
(47)
where k1, k2, k4 are positive control gains, zf is an
auxiliary variable generated by player f and x¯ =
[z1, z2, · · · , zn, xn+1, xn+2, · · · , xN ]T . Moreover, Wˆi ∈
R
q×1, in which q is the number of neurons, defines the
weight matrix of the RBFNN. Motivated by [31], we update
the weight matrices Wˆf and Wˆs by
˙ˆ
Wf =


βSf (x¯)(xf − zf ), if Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) < Wmax
or Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) =Wmax and (xf − zf )WˆTf Sf (x¯) < 0
βSf (x¯)(xf − zf )− β (xf−zf )Wˆ
T
f Sf (x¯)
Tr(WˆT
f
Wˆf )
Wˆf ,
if Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) = Wmax and (xf − zf )WˆTf Sf (x¯) ≥ 0
and
˙ˆ
Ws =


βSs(x¯)v¯s, if Tr(Wˆ
T
s Wˆs) < Wmax
or Tr(WˆTs Wˆs) = Wmax and v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(x¯) < 0
βSs(x¯)v¯s − β v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(x¯)
Tr(WˆTs Wˆs)
Wˆs,
if Tr(WˆTs Wˆs) =Wmax and v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(x¯) ≥ 0,
(48)
where β, Wmax are positive constants, v¯s = vs+k1∇sFs(x¯)
and Tr(WˆTi (0)Wˆi(0)) ≤Wmax.
Remark 5: Note that if Tr(WˆTi (0)Wˆi(0)) ≤ Wmax, then,
Tr(WˆTi (t)Wˆi(t)) ≤ Wmax and ‖W˜i‖F=‖Wˆi − W ∗i ‖F ≤
2
√
Wmax [31].
Furthermore,
φf = δtanh(
Kδ(xf − zf)
ǫ
), φs = δtanh(
Kδv¯s
ǫ
), (49)
in which ǫ > 0 is a constant, and δ is a constant that satisfies
|δ| ≥ ‖ε‖+‖d(t)‖, where ε = [ε1, ε2, · · · , εN ]T and d(t) =
[d1(t), d2(t), · · · , dN (t)]T .
Recalling the players’ dynamics in (46), the centralized
Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is given as
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− WˆTf Sf (x¯)
− φf + gf(x) + df (t)
z˙f =− k1∇fFf (x¯), f ∈ νf
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(x¯)− WˆTs Ss(x¯)
− φs + gs(x) + ds(t), s ∈ νs.
(50)
Writing (50) in its concatenated-vector form gives
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− WˆTf Sf (x¯)
− φf + gf (x) + df (t)
z˙f =− k1P¯f(x¯)
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2P¯s(x¯)− WˆTs Ss(x¯)
− φs + gs(x) + ds(t),
(51)
where zf = [z1, z2, · · · , zn]T , WˆTf Sf (x) =
[(WˆT1 S1(x))
T , · · · , (WˆTn Sn(x))T ]T , WˆTs Ss(x) =
[(WˆTn+1Sn+1(x))
T , · · · , (WˆTNSN(x))T ]T , φf =
[φT1 , · · · , φTn ]T , φs = [φTn+1, · · · , φTN ]T , gf (x) =
[gT1 (x), · · · , gTn (x)]T , gs(x) = [gTn+1(x), · · · , gTN (x)]T ,
df (t) = [d
T
1 (t), · · · , dTn (t)]T , and ds(t) =
[dTn+1(t), · · · , dTN (t)]T .
The following lemma is given to support the stability
analysis.
Lemma 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1,3-5 are satisfied
and
k2 >
(k21hl1 + 1)
2
4k1m
+k1h, k4 >
Φ22
4λmin(A1)
+
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi},
(52)
where A1 =
[
k1m −k
2
1l1h+1
2
−k21l1h+12 k2 − k1h
]
, Φ2 = k1l1 +
√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi} +
√
N − nmaxi∈νs{ηi} and ηi is the
Lipschitz constant of gi(x). Then, vs(t), x(t) and zf (t)
generated by (50) are bounded given that their initial values
are bounded.
Proof: Let
vs = v¯s − k1P¯s(x¯). (53)
Then,
x˙s =v¯s − k1P¯s(x¯)
˙¯vs =− k2v¯s + k1H(x¯) ˙¯x
− WˆTs Ss(x¯)− φs + gs(x) + ds(t).
(54)
Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
1
2
(x¯− x∗)T (x¯− x∗) + 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s
+
1
2
(xf − zf )T (xf − zf ).
(55)
Then,
(x¯− x∗)T ˙¯x = (x¯− x∗)[z˙Tf , x˙Ts ]T
=− k1(x¯− x∗)T P¯(x¯) + (x¯− x∗)T [0Tn , v¯Ts ]T
≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 + ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖.
(56)
Moreover,
v¯Ts ˙¯vs = v¯
T
s (−k2v¯s + k1H(x¯) ˙¯x)
+ v¯Ts (−WˆTs Ss(x¯) + ds(t)− φs + gs(x))
=− k2‖v¯s‖2 − k21v¯Ts H(x¯)P¯(x¯)
+ k1v¯
T
s H(x¯)[0
T
n , v¯
T
s ]
T + v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(x∗))
+ v¯Ts (−WˆTs Ss(x¯) + ds(t)− φs + gs(x∗))
≤− (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2 + k21hl1‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||+ as‖v¯s‖
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||x¯− x∗||,
(57)
in which as =
√
N − n(√q√Wmax + δ + d + g), d, g are
positive constants that satisfy |di(t)| < d, |gi(x∗)| < g and
ηi is the Lipschitz constant of gi(x). Moreover, the last
inequality is obtained by utilizing ‖P¯(x¯)‖= ‖P¯(x¯)−P¯(x∗)‖
≤ l1‖x¯− x∗‖ based on Assumption 1.
Furthermore,
(xf − zf )T (x˙f − z˙f )
=(xf − zf )T (−k4(xf − zf ) + k1P¯f (x¯))
+ (xf − zf )T (−WˆTf Sf (x¯)− φf + gf (x∗) + df (t))
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x)− gf (x∗))
≤− (k4 −
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖2 + af‖xf − zf‖
+ (k1l1 +
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
(58)
in which af =
√
n(
√
q
√
Wmax + δ + d+ g). Hence,
V˙ ≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2
− (k4 −
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖2 + af‖xf − zf‖
+ (k21hl1 + 1)‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ (k1l1 +
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖+ as‖v¯s‖
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||x¯− x∗||.
(59)
Define A1 =
[
k1m −Φ12
−Φ12 k2 − k1h
]
, where Φ1 =
k21l1h + 1 +
√
N − nmaxi∈νs{ηi}, and let k2 >
(k21hl1+1+
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi})2
4k1m
+k1h. Then, A1 is symmetric
positive definite and
V˙ ≤− λmin(A1)‖E1‖2 − (k4 −
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖2
+ (k1l1 +
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ af‖xf − zf‖+ as‖v¯s‖,
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
(60)
in which λmin(A1) > 0, E1 = [(x¯ − x∗)T , v¯Ts ]T .
Define A2 =
[
λmin(A1) −Φ22
−Φ22 k4 −
√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi}
]
,
where Φ2 = k1l1 +
√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi} +√
N − nmaxi∈νs{ηi}, and let k4 > Φ
2
2
4λmin(A1)
+√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi}. Then, A2 is symmetric positive matrix.
Hence
V˙ ≤− λmin(A2)‖E ‖2 + (af + as)‖E‖
=− (λmin(A2)− θ)‖E‖2
+ (af + as)‖E‖ − θ‖E‖2,
(61)
in which λmin(A2) > 0, E = [(x¯−x∗)T , v¯Ts , (xf − zf )T ]T
and 0 < θ < λmin(A2).
Hence,
V˙ ≤ −(λmin(A2)− θ)‖E‖2, (62)
for ∀‖E‖ ≥ af+as
θ
.
Therefore, according to Theorem 4.18 in [25], it can
be obtained that ‖E‖ is bounded given that the states are
initialized to be bounded. Recalling the definition of v¯s, the
conclusion can be obtained.
By Lemma 4, the trajectories generated by the proposed
method belong to a compact set given that they are initialized
to be bounded. Hence, by Lemma 1, it is clear that gi(x)
can be approximated as gi(x) = W
∗
i
TSi(x) + εi, where
W ∗i ∈ Rq×1 is the optimal weight matrix and εi ∈ R
is the approximation error. Therefore, the centralized Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy can be written as
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− W˜Tf Sf (x¯)
+ df (t) + εf − φf + gf(x) − gf(x¯)
z˙f =− k1∇fFf (x¯), f ∈ νf
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(x¯)− W˜Ts Ss(x¯)
+ ds(t) + εs − φs + gs(x) − gs(x¯), s ∈ νs.
(63)
Moreover, the concatenated-vector form of (63) is
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− W˜Tf Sf (x¯)
+ (df (t) + εf − φf ) + gf (x)− gf (x¯)
z˙f =− k1P¯f(x¯)
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2P¯s(x¯)− W˜Ts Ss(x¯)
+ (ds(t) + εs − φs) + gs(x) − gs(x¯).
(64)
The following theorem establishes the stability of (63).
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1,3-5 are satisfied.
Then, for any pair of positive constants Λ and Ξ, there exists
a positive constant k∗1(Λ,Ξ) such that for each fixed k1 > k
∗
1 ,
there exist positive constants k∗2 , k
∗
4 , β
∗ such that for each
k2 > k
∗
2 , k4 > k
∗
4 , β > β
∗, there exists a positive constant
T such that
‖x(t)− x∗‖+ ‖vs(t)‖ ≤ Ξ, ∀t > T, (65)
given that ‖[(x¯(0) − x∗)T ,vs(0)T , (xf (0) − zf (0))T ]T ‖ +∑N
i=1 Tr(W˜i(0)
T
W˜i(0)) ≤ Λ and Tr(W ∗i TW ∗i ) ≤Wmax.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4, (66)
in which
V1 =
1
2
(x¯− x∗)T (x¯− x∗) , V2 = 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s
V3 =
1
2
(xf − zf )T (xf − zf ), V4 = 1
2β
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i).
(67)
Then, by (56),
V˙1 ≤ −k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 + ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖. (68)
and
V˙2 =v¯
T
s
˙¯vs = v¯
T
s (−k2v¯s + k1H(x¯) ˙¯x+ gs(x)− gs(x¯))
− v¯Ts W˜Ts Ss(x¯) + v¯Ts (ds(t)− φs + εs)
=− k2‖v¯s‖2 − k21v¯Ts H(x¯)P¯(x¯)
+ k1v¯
T
s H(x¯)[0
T
n , v¯
T
s ]
T + v¯Ts (gs(x) − gs(x¯))
− v¯Ts W˜Ts Ss(x¯) + v¯Ts (ds(t)− φs + εs)
≤− (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2 + (N − n)ǫ
+ k21hl1‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖ − v¯Ts W˜Ts Ss(x¯)
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||,
(69)
in which we have utilized that v¯Ts (ds(t) + εs − φs)) ≤
(N − n)ǫ, which can be easily proved by Lemma 3.
Moreover,
V˙3 =(xf − zf )T (x˙f − z˙f )
=(xf − zf )T (−k4(xf − zf ) + k1P¯f(x¯))
− (xf − zf )T (W˜Tf Sf (x¯) + gs(x) − gs(x¯))
+ (xf − zf )T (−φf + εf + df (t))
≤− k4‖xf − zf‖2 + nǫ+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
− (xf − zf )TW˜Tf Sf (x¯) +
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||2,
(70)
in which (xf −zf )T (−φf +εf +df (t)) ≤ nǫ can be easily
proved by Lemma 3.
Furthermore,
V˙4 =
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti
˙˜Wi)
β
=
n∑
f=1
Tr(W˜Tf
˙ˆ
Wf )
β
+
N∑
s=n+1
Tr(W˜Ts
˙ˆ
Ws)
β
.
(71)
Hence,
V˙ ≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2
− k4‖xf − zf‖2 +Nǫ
+ (k21hl1 + 1)‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
+
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||2
+
n∑
f=1
Tr
(
W˜Tf
(
˙ˆ
Wf
β
− Sf (x¯)(xf − zf )
))
+
N∑
s=n+1
Tr
(
W˜Ts
(
˙ˆ
Ws
β
− Ss(x¯)v¯s
))
≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − (k2 − k1h)‖v¯s‖2
(72)
− k4‖xf − zf‖2 +Nǫ+ (k21hl1 + 1)‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖ −
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i)
+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
+
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||2 + 4NWmax,
in which
∑n
f=1 Tr
(
W˜Tf
(
˙ˆ
Wf
β
− Sf (x¯)(xf − zf )
))
≤ 0
and
∑N
s=n+1 Tr
(
W˜Ts
( ˙ˆ
Ws
β
− Ss(x¯)v¯s
))
≤ 0, which can
be obtained by following the proof of Theorem 2 in [31].
Hence,
V˙ ≤ −
(
k1m− 1
2ρ1
)
‖x¯− x∗‖2 −Ψ1‖v¯s‖2 +Nǫ
− (k4 −
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi} −
√
N − nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2
)‖xf − zf‖2
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖ −
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i) + 4NWmax,
(73)
where ρ1 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen
and Ψ1 = k2 − k1h− ρ1(k
2
1hl1+1)
2+
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 .
In addition,
V˙ ≤−Ψ2‖x¯− x∗‖2 −Ψ1‖v¯s‖2 −Ψ3‖xf − zf‖2
−
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i) + 4NWmax +Nǫ,
(74)
where ρ2 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily
chosen, Ψ2 = k1m − 12ρ1 −
l1
2ρ2
and Ψ3 = k4 − ρ2l1k
2
1
2 −√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi} −
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 .
Therefore,
V˙ ≤ −KV +∆, (75)
where K = 2min{Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, β} and ∆ = Nǫ+4NWmax.
Hence,
V ≤ V (0)e−Kt + ∆
K
(1− e−Kt), (76)
by Lemma 2.
Recalling the definition of the Lyapunov candidate func-
tion, it can be obtained that
‖x¯(t)− x∗‖2 + ‖v¯s(t)‖2 + ‖xf (t)− zf (t)‖2
≤2V (0)e−Kt + 2∆
K
.
(77)
In addition, with fixed ρ1 and ρ2, we can choose k1 to be
sufficiently large such that Ψ2 > 0 and is sufficiently large.
Moreover, with fixed k1, ρ1 and ρ2, we can choose k2, k4
and β to be sufficiently large such thatK is sufficiently large.
Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion.

In this section, we consider mixed-order games in which
the players’ dynamics are subject to unmodeled dynamics
and external disturbance by designing a centralized method.
In the following, we propose a distributed counterpart for the
considered problem.
B. A distributed algorithm for mixed-order multi-player
games
To achieve disturbance rejection for the mixed-order
games in (46), the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
strategy is designed as
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf)− WˆTf Sf (yf )
− φf + gf (x) + df (t)
z˙f =− k1∇fFf (yf ), f ∈ νf
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(ys)− WˆTs Ss(ys)
− φs + gs(x) + ds(t), s ∈ νs
y˙ij =− k3
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − x¯j)
)
i, j ∈ ℵ,
(78)
where k1, k2, k3, k4 are positive constants, x¯j = zj for j ∈
νf and x¯j = xj for j ∈ νs. In addition, the weight matrices
Wˆf and Wˆs are updated according to
˙ˆ
Wf =


βSf (yf )(xf − zf ), if Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) < Wmax
or Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) =Wmax and (xf − zf )WˆTf Sf (yf ) < 0
βSf (yf )(xf − zf )− β (xf−zf )Wˆ
T
f Sf (yf )
Tr(WˆT
f
Wˆf )
Wˆf ,
if Tr(WˆTf Wˆf ) = Wmax and (xf − zf )WˆTf Sf (yf ) ≥ 0
and
˙ˆ
Ws =


βSs(ys)v¯s, if Tr(Wˆ
T
s Wˆs) < Wmax
or Tr(WˆTs Wˆs) = Wmax and v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(ys) < 0
βSs(ys)v¯s − β v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(ys)
Tr(WˆTs Wˆs)
Wˆs,
if Tr(WˆTs Wˆs) = Wmax and v¯sWˆ
T
s Ss(ys) ≥ 0.
(79)
Moreover, the concatenated-vector form of (78) is
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− WˆTf Sf (y¯f )
− φf + gf (x) + df (t)
z˙f =− k1P¯f (y¯f )
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2P¯s(y¯s)− WˆTs Ss(y¯s)
− φs + gs(x) + ds(t)
y˙ =− k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x¯).
(80)
The following lemma is given to support the upcoming
stability analysis.
Lemma 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied.
Then, there exists a positive constant k∗1 such that for each
k1 > k
∗
1 , there exist positive constants k
∗
3 , k
∗
4 such that for
k3 > k
∗
3 , k4 > k
∗
4 , there exists a positive constant k
∗
2 such
that for k2 > k
∗
2 , x(t), zf (t), vs(t) and y(t) generated by
the proposed method in (78) stay bounded given that their
initial values are bounded.
Proof: Let
vs = v¯s − k1P¯s(y¯s). (81)
Then,
x˙s =v¯s − k1P¯s(y¯s)
˙¯vs =v˙s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys = −k2v¯s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys
− WˆTs Ss(y¯s)− φs + gs(x) + ds(t).
(82)
Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4, (83)
where
V1 =
1
2
(x¯− x∗)T (x¯− x∗), V2 = 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s
V3 =
1
2
(xf − zf )T (xf − zf )
V4 =(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x¯).
(84)
Then,
V˙1 =(x¯− x∗)T ˙¯x = (x¯− x∗)[z˙Tf , x˙Ts ]T
=− k1(x¯− x∗)T P¯(y) + (x¯− x∗)T [0Tn , v¯Ts ]T
=− k1(x¯− x∗)T (P¯(x¯)− P¯(x∗))
+ k1(x¯− x∗)T (P¯(x¯)− P¯(y))
+ (x¯− x∗)T [0Tn , v¯Ts ]T
≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 + ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖x¯− x∗‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖,
(85)
and
V˙2 =v¯
T
s (−k2v¯s + k1H1(ys)y˙s)
+ v¯Ts (−WˆTs Ss(ys) + ds(t)− φs + gs(x))
=− k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1v¯Ts H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys
+ v¯Ts (−WˆTs Ss(y¯s) + ds(t)− φs + gs(x))
≤− k2‖v¯s‖2 + as‖v¯s‖+ v¯Ts (gs(x) − gs(x∗))
+ k1k3b‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖,
(86)
in which b = sup
y¯s∈RN‖H1(y¯s)‖‖L ⊗ IN×N +A‖ and as
is defined in the proof of Lemma 4.
Moreover,
V˙3 =(xf − zf )T (x˙f − z˙f )
=(xf − zf )T (−k4(xf − zf ) + k1P¯f (y¯f ))
+(xf − zf )T (−WˆTf Sf (y¯f )− φf + gf (x) + df (t))
≤− k4‖xf − zf‖2 + af‖xf − zf‖
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖xf − zf‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf (x∗))
(87)
where af is defined in the proof of Lemma 4 and we have
utilized that ‖P¯(y)‖ = ‖P¯(y) − P¯(x¯) + P¯(x¯)− P¯(x∗)‖ ≤
maxi∈ℵ{l¯i}‖y−1N⊗x‖+ l1‖x−x∗‖ based on Assumption
1.
Furthermore,
V˙4 =(y˙ − 1N ⊗ ˙¯x)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP(y˙ − 1N ⊗ ˙¯x)
=− k3(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)T(L ⊗ IN×N +A)P(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)
− k3(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP(L⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)
− 2(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP1N ⊗ ˙¯x
≤− k3λmin(Q)‖y − 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ 2k1(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP1N ⊗ P¯(y)
− 2(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP1N ⊗ [0Tn , v¯Ts ]T
≤− k3λmin(Q)‖y − 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ 2k1l1‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ 2k1l1
√
N‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ 2
√
N‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖.
(88)
Hence,
V˙ ≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − k4‖xf − zf‖2 − k2‖v¯s‖2
− (k3λmin(Q)− 2k1l1‖P‖)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ (1 +
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi})‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖+ as‖v¯s‖
+ (2k1l1
√
N‖P‖+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i})‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ (2
√
N‖P‖+ k1k3b)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖
+ (k1l1 +
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi})‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ (k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i})‖xf − zf‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖
+ af‖xf − zf‖+
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
+
√
nmax
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||2.
(89)
Therefore,
V˙ ≤− Ψ¯1||x¯− x∗||2 − Ψ¯2||xf − zf ||2 − Ψ¯3||v¯s||2
− Ψ¯4||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||2 + af ||xf − zf ||+ as||v¯s||,
(90)
where ρi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are positive constants that can be ar-
bitrarily chosen, Ψ¯1 = k1m− 1+
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 − ρ1+ρ32 ,
Ψ¯2 = k4 −
√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi} −
(k1l1+
√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi})2
2ρ3
−
(k1 maxi∈ℵ{l¯i})2
2ρ4
−
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 , Ψ¯3 =
k2 − 1+
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 − ρ2(2
√
N‖P‖+k1k3b)2
2 −√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 and Ψ¯4 = k3λmin(Q) − 2k1l1‖P‖ −
1
2ρ2
− ρ42 − (2k1l1
√
N‖P‖+k1 maxi∈ℵ{l¯i})2
2ρ1
.
Hence, by choosing k1 to be sufficiently large, Ψ¯1 > 0.
Then, for fixed k1, we can choose k3 and k4 to be sufficiently
large such that Ψ¯2 > 0 and Ψ¯4 > 0. Then, for fixed
k1, k3, k4, we can choose k2 to be sufficiently large such
that Ψ¯3 > 0. By such a tuning rule, there exists a positive
constant θ¯ such that
V˙ ≤ −θ¯V + af ||xf − zf ||+ as||v¯s||, (91)
from which the conclusion can be easily concluded.
By Lemma 5, we can conclude that gi(yi) =
W ∗i
TSi(yi) + εi by Lemma 1. Hence, we can obtain that
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− W˜Tf Sf (yf )
+ gf(x) − gf(yf ) + df (t) + εf − φf
z˙f =− k1∇fFf (yf ), f ∈ νf
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2∇sFs(ys)− W˜Ts Ss(ys)
+ gs(x)− gs(yf ) + ds(t) + εs − φs, s ∈ νs
y˙ij =− k3
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − x¯j)
)
i, j ∈ ℵ,
(92)
Moreover, the concatenated-vector form of (92) is
x˙f =− k4(xf − zf )− W˜Tf Sf (y¯f )
+ gf(x) − gf (y¯f ) + (df (t) + εf − φf )
z˙f =− k1P¯f (y¯f )
x˙s =vs
v˙s =− k2vs − k1k2P¯s(y¯s)− W˜Ts Ss(y¯s)
+ gs(x)− gs(y¯f ) + (ds(t) + εs − φs)
y˙ =− k3(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x¯).
(93)
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied.
Then, for any pair of positive constants Λ and Ξ, there exists
a positive constant β∗ and k∗1 such that for β > β
∗ and k1 >
k∗1 such that there exist positive constants k
∗
3 and k
∗
4 such
that for k3 > k
∗
3 , k4 > k
∗
4 , there exists a positive constant
k∗2 such that for k2 > k
∗
2 , there exists a positive constant T
such that
‖x(t)− x∗‖+ ‖v(t)‖ ≤ Ξ, ∀t > T, (94)
given that ‖[(x¯(0) − x∗)T ,vs(0)T , (y(0) − 1N ⊗
x¯(0))T , (xf (0)− zf (0))T ]T ‖+
∑N
i=1 Tr(W˜i(0)
T
W˜i(0)) ≤
Λ.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = V1 + V2 + V3 + V4 + V5, (95)
where
V1 =
1
2
(x¯− x∗)T (x¯− x∗), V2 = 1
2
v¯Ts v¯s
V3 =
1
2
(xf − zf )T (xf − zf )
V4 =(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x¯)
V5 =
1
2β
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i)
(96)
Then,
V˙1 ≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 + ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖x¯− x∗‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖, (97)
and
V˙2 =v¯
T
s
˙¯vs = v¯
T
s (−k2v¯s + k1H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys)
+ v¯Ts (−W˜Ts Ss(y¯s) + ds(t)− φs + εs)
+ v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(y¯s))
=− k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1v¯Ts H1(y¯s) ˙¯ys
+ v¯Ts (−W˜Ts Ss(y¯s) + ds(t)− φs + εs)
+ v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(y¯s))
≤− k2‖v¯s‖2 + k1k3b‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖
− v¯Ts W˜Ts Ss(y¯s) + (N − n)ǫ
+ v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(y¯s)).
(98)
Moreover,
V˙3 =(xf − zf )T (x˙f − z˙f )
=(xf − zf )T (−k4(xf − zf ) + k1P¯f (yf ))
+ (xf − zf )T (−W˜Tf Sf (y¯f )− φf + εf + df (t))
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf(y¯f ))
≤− k4‖xf − zf‖2 + nǫ
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖xf − zf‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖
− (xf − zf )TW˜Tf Sf (y¯f )
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf(y¯f )),
(99)
and
V˙4 ≤− k3λmin(Q)‖y − 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ 2k1l1‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ 2k1l1
√
N‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ 2
√
N‖P‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖.
(100)
Furthermore,
V˙5 =
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti
˙˜Wi)
β
=
n∑
f=1
Tr(W˜Tf
˙ˆ
Wf )
β
+
N∑
s=n+1
Tr(W˜Ts
˙ˆ
Ws)
β
.
(101)
Hence,
V˙ ≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − k4‖xf − zf‖2 − k2‖v¯s‖2
− (k3λmin(Q)− 2k1l1‖P‖)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖+Nǫ+ (2k1l1
√
N‖P‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i})‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ (2
√
N‖P‖+ k1k3b)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖xf − zf‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖
+
n∑
f=1
Tr
(
W˜Tf
(
˙ˆ
Wf
β
− Sf (y¯f )(xf − zf)
))
+
N∑
s=n+1
Tr
(
W˜Ts
(
˙ˆ
Ws
β
− Ss(y¯s)v¯s
))
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf(y¯f )) + v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(y¯s))
≤− k1m‖x¯− x∗‖2 − k4‖xf − zf‖2 − k2‖v¯s‖2
− (k3λmin(Q)− 2k1l1‖P‖)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖2
+ (2k1l1
√
N‖P‖+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i})‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖x¯− x∗‖
+ (2
√
N‖P‖+ k1k3b)‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1l1‖xf − zf‖‖x¯− x∗‖+ ‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖
+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i}‖xf − zf‖‖y− 1N ⊗ x¯‖
−
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i) +Nǫ+ 4NWmax
+ (xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf(y¯s)) + v¯Ts (gf (x)− gf (y¯s)).
(102)
Noticing that
‖x¯− x∗‖‖v¯s‖ ≤ 1
2ρ1
||x¯− x∗||2 + ρ1
2
||v¯s||2, (103)
where ρ1 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen
and
(2k1l1
√
N ||P||+ k1max
i∈ℵ
{l¯i})||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||||x¯− x∗||
≤ (2l1
√
N ||P||+maxi∈ℵ{l¯i})2
2ρ2
||x− x∗||2
+
ρ2k
2
1
2
||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||2,
(104)
where ρ2 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen.
In addition,
(2
√
N ||P||+ k1k3b)||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||||v¯s||
≤
(√
N ||P||
ρ3
+
k23b
2ρ3
)
||v¯s||2
+
(√
N ||P||ρ3 +
k21bρ3
2
)
||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||2,
(105)
where ρ3 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen.
Furthermore,
k1l1||xf−zf ||||x¯−x∗|| ≤ l1
2ρ4
||x¯−x∗||2+ρ4l1k
2
1
2
||xf−zf ||2
(106)
and
k1l1||xf − zf ||||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||
≤ l1
2ρ5
||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||2 + ρ5l1k
2
1
2
||xf − zf ||2,
(107)
where ρ4, ρ5 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen.
Hence,
V˙ ≤− Φ¯1||x¯− x∗||2 − (k2 − ρ1
2
−
√
N ||P||
ρ3
− k
2
3b
2ρ3
)||v¯s||2
−
(
k4 − ρ4l1k
2
1
2
− k
2
1 l1ρ5
2
)
||xf − zf ||2
−
(
k3λmin(Q)− 2k1l1||P|| − ρ2k
2
1
2
−
√
N ||P||ρ3
−k
2
1bρ3
2
− l1
2ρ5
)
||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||2 +Nǫ+ 4NWmax
−
N∑
i=1
Tr(W˜Ti W˜i) + (xf − zf )T (gf (x)− gf (y¯s))
+ v¯Ts (gf (x)− gf (y¯s)),
(108)
where Φ¯1 = k1m − 12ρ1 −
(2l1
√
N ||P||+maxi∈ℵ{l¯i})2
2ρ2
− l12ρ4 .
By further noticing that
(xf − zf )T (gf (x) − gf (y¯f ))
≤√nmax
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||2
+max
i∈νf
{ηi}||xf − zf ||||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||,
(109)
and similarly,
v¯Ts (gs(x)− gs(y¯s))
≤
√
N − nmax
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||xf − zf ||
+max
i∈νs
{ηi}||v¯s||||y − 1N ⊗ x¯||.
(110)
Let Φ¯2 = k2− ρ12 −
√
N ||P||
ρ3
− k23b2ρ3 −
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 −
maxi∈νs{ηi}
2 , Φ¯3 = k4 −
ρ4l1k
2
1
2 −
k21l1ρ5
2 −√
nmaxi∈νf {ηi} −
maxi∈νf {ηi}
2 −
√
N−nmaxi∈νs{ηi}
2 ,
and Φ¯4 = λmin(P)(k3λmin(Q) − 2k1l1||P|| − ρ2k
2
1
2 −√
N ||P||ρ3 − k
2
1bρ3
2 − l12ρ5 −
maxi∈νf {ηi}
2 −
maxi∈νs{ηi}
2 ),
then,
V˙ ≤ −KV +Nǫ+ 4NWmax, (111)
where K = 2min{Φ¯1, Φ¯2, Φ¯3, Φ¯4, β}/max{ 12 , λmax(P)}.
Hence, by Lemma 2, we can obtain that
V (t) ≤ V (0)e−Kt + Nǫ+ 4NWmax
K
, (112)
whereK can be arbitrarily large by the following tuning rule:
choose k1 to be sufficiently large such that Φ¯1 is sufficiently
large. Then, for fixed k1, choose k3, k4 such that Φ¯3 and
Φ¯4 are sufficiently large. Then, for fixed k3, choose k2 to
be sufficiently large such that for fixed k3, choose k2 to be
sufficiently large such that Φ¯2 is sufficiently large. If this
is the case, K is sufficiently large with sufficiently large
β, indicating that V (t) can converge to an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of zero by such a tuning rule. Recalling the
definitions of the Lyapunov candidate function and v¯s, the
conclusion can be obtained.

VI. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, we consider the connectivity control of
a network of 5 sensors considered in [26] in which the
objective function of sensor i is given as
Fi(x) = hi(xi) + li(x), (113)
where xi = [xi1, xi2]
T ∈ R2 and
hi(xi) = x
T
i miixi + x
T
i mi + i, (114)
in which mii =
[
i 0
0 i
]
,mi = [i, i]
T . Moreover, l1(x) =
‖x1 − x2‖2, l2(x) = ‖x2 − x3‖2, l3(x) = ‖x3 − x2‖2,
l4(x) = ‖x4 − x2‖2+ ‖x4 − x5‖2 and l5(x) = ‖x5 − x1‖2.
It was calculated in [26] that on the Nash equilibrium of
the game, x∗ij = − 12 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, j ∈ {1, 2}. In
the following simulations, we suppose that sensors 1-3 are
first-order integrator-type sensors and sensors 4-5 are second-
order integrator-type sensors.
A. Nash equilibrium seeking for mixed-order integrator-type
games
In this section, we consider that the players’ dynamics are
given by
x˙f = uf , f ∈ νf
x¨s = us, s ∈ νs.
(115)
In the subsequent simulations, the proposed methods in (13)
and (28) will be numerically verified one by one.
1) Centralized Nash equilibrium seeking: Let x(0) =
[−8, 5,−2,−4,−5, 7, 1,−8,−1, 9]T,vs(0) =[0, 0, 0, 0]T .
Then, the simulation results generated by the proposed
method in (13) are shown in Figs. 1-2, in which Fig. 1 shows
the evolutions of the players’ positions and Fig. 2 illustrates
vs(t). From the simulation results, we see that the players’
actions would converge to the Nash equilibrium.
2) Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking: In this
section, we suppose that x(0) = [−5, 3,−4,−6,
1, 8, 0,−8,−1, 10]T , and vs(0) =[−10,−10, 20, 20]T .
Moreover, y(0) is initialized at zero. With the
communication graph given in Fig. 3, the simulation
results generated by (28) are shown in Figs. 4-5, in which
Fig. 4 shows the evolutions of the players’ positions.
In addition, Fig. 5 plots the trajectories of vs(t). The
simulation results demonstrate that the players’ actions
would converge to the Nash equilibrium, thus verifying
Theorem 2.
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Fig. 1: The trajectories of players’ positions generated by
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Fig. 2: The trajectories of vs(t) generated by (13).
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Fig. 3: The communication graph among the players.
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Fig. 5: vs(t) generated by (28).
B. Mixed-order games with unmodeled dynamics and distur-
bances
In the section, we consider that the players’ actions are
given by
x˙f = uf + gf (x) + df (t), f ∈ νf
x¨s = us + gs(x) + ds(t), s ∈ νs.
(116)
In addition, gi(x)+di(t) in the players’ dynamics are x21+
sin(t), x22 + sin(t), x
2
21 + x31 + 2sin(2t), x22 + 2sin(2t),
3x31 + 3sin(3t), 3x32 + 3sin(3t), 4x41 + 4sin(4t),4x42 +
4sin(4t), 5x51 + 5sin(5t), 5x52 + 5sin(5t), respectively.
In the simulation, the number of neurons of the RBFNN is
chosen as 11 and the centers of RBFNN activation function
are -2.5, -2, -1.5, -1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, respectively.
Furthermore, the variances are all set as 5
√
2. By setting
Wmax = 500, β = 100, δ = 10, ǫ = 0.01 and Wˆi(0) as a zero
matrix, the centralized algorithm in (50) and the distributed
algorithm in (78) will be simulated, successively.
1) Centralized Nash equilibrium seeking: With x(0) =
[−8, 5,−2,−4, −5, 7, 1,−8,−1, 9]T ,vs(0) =[0, 0, 0, 0]T ,
the simulation results produced by (50) are plotted in Figs.
6-7. Fig. 6 plots the evolutions of the players’ positions and
Fig. 7 illustrates vs(t) generated by the proposed method.
From the simulation results, it can be concluded that the
players’ actions would be driven to the Nash equilibrium by
the proposed methods.
2) Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking: With x(0) =
[−5, 8,−4,−6, 1, 8, 0,−8,−1, 10]T,vs(0) = [0, 0, 0, 0]T ,
the simulation results produced by (78) are given in Figs.
8-9 by utilizing the communication graph in Fig. 3. Figs. 8-
9 illustrate the evolutions of the players’ positions and vs(t),
from which we see that the players’ actions would converge
to the Nash equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for mixed-
order multi-player games consisting of first-order integrator-
type players and second-order integrator-type players. A cen-
tralized algorithm is designed based on the gradient search,
followed by a distributed seeking strategy. Considering that
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Fig. 6: The evolutions of players’ positions generated by
(50).
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Fig. 7: vs(t) generated by (50).
unmodeled dynamics and external disturbances are inevitable
in many practical situations, we further address mixed-
order games in which the players are subject to unmodeled
dynamics and time-varying disturbances. In this situation, a
centralized algorithm and a distributed algorithm are pro-
posed one by one. The convergence of the proposed seeking
strategies are investigated analytically based on Lyapunov
stability analysis.
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